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Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many
other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything
from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these
changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United
States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a
single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesate market. This research uses experimental
methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic
uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental
results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market
power could be a real concern.
Restructuring of electric power markets is proceed-
ing across the United States and in many other
nations around the world. For much of the north-
eastern United States, restructuring proposals in-
clude, at least for the short term, the formation of
a single-sided auction mechanism for the whole-
sale generation market. The performance of these
auction markets will influence everything from the
prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the
systems.
This paper reports on research examining poten-
tial auction institutions for restructured markets for
electric power through a series of economic experi-
ments. 1 The primary factors for analysis in this
research were efficiency and pricing. The potential
for owners of electric generators to achieve market
power was a major focus as well. The secondary
concern in the experiments was to compare the
induced cost curves and the actual offer curves in
an effort to determine if strategic supply reduction
should be a concern, The setting of these experi-
ments was designed to match as well as could be
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the markets outlined in the various short-term re-
structuring proposals. The experiments were con-
ducted in the absence of a network, the equivalent
of a system where transmission of electric power
occurs without loss of power and is costless.
Experimental methods were the best way to ap-
proach this area of research. By constructing simi-
lar markets in a laboratory setting, we were able to
control extraneous variables that complicate real
world situations. Furthermore, using experimental
methods allowed us to compare prices from the
auction with optimal prices and to determine actual
achieved efficiencies. To see the importance of
these abilities, imagine the expenses and difficul-
ties in implementing an untested system on a wide
scale and then discovering problems. By that stage,
a substantial portion of the information necessary
for analysis would be private and the extent of any
problems difficult to gauge. As an example of the
importance of experimental studies of new auction
markets, consider the FCC’s use of such methods
during its design process for the spectrum auctions
(see, for instance, the fall 1997 special issue of the
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy).
The next section gives the necessary background
to the discussion, reviewing first the typical form
for restructuring electric power markets and then
some of the basic principles of auctions. Following
that section, details and results from the experi-
ments are presented; then some early experiments
conducted with a realistic network are noted
briefly and important future areas for research are
discussed. The final section presents the general
conclusions observable at this point.(26 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Background
Recent history has witnessed a fundamental shift in
the traditional view of the electric power industry.
Restructuring proposals have been advanced, and
in places put into effect, attempting to bring com-
petition to an industry long heavily regulated. A
commonly proposed framework calls for the cre-
ation of an entity, referred to as an independent
system operator (ISO), responsible for managing
the relationships among the generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution sectors of the industry. An-
other task of the ISO, and the one that is the focus
of this paper, would be to run a wholesale auction
market for generation of electric power. These auc-
tions would be run hourly to purchase enough gen-
eration to meet the forecast load demand. An im-
portant distinction of this market, at least in many
short-term proposals, is that the 1S0 would, in ef-
fect, be the single buyer. Thus, the market to be
examined is a single-sided auction, with many sell-
ers and a single buyer. The rules of this auction
could go far in determining the prices and effi-
ciency within the restructured industry.
There exist different classes of auctions, and
many variations in rules are possible within each.
These differing institutional rules can lead to dif-
fering incentives on the part of participants and can
lead to poor performance in terms of both effi-
ciency and pricing. While William Vickrey spurred
much of the current effort in auctions with his
seminal work of 1961, there remains a great deal
yet to be discovered in terms of performance and in
understanding the incentives generated. An ideal
auction for a generation market would be incentive
compatible; in other words, it would contain the
correct incentives for power producers to offer
their full generating capacity at its actual cost.
In gauging the possibilities for problems, the
experience of auctions elsewhere in the economy
can be considered. Auctions have long been used
to sell many agricultural commodities and other
types of products. The U.S. government uses auc-
tions to award rights (for such things as oil leases)
and to sell debt. In such large-scale settings, auc-
tion performance is of particular concern. A recent
example where concerns have been raised occurred
in 1997, when the government auctioned off sec-
tions of the broadcast spectrum. To some observ-
ers, it appeared as if the auction had failed to ex-
tract an appropriate level of revenue. In this and
other instances, some have also questioned wheth-
er certain auction mechanisms allow firms to sig-
nal each other of their bidding intentions (Weber
1997).
The potential for participants to control the auc-
tion is of obvious importance. In particular, the
extent to which it may be possible to gain excess
profits through gaming in these auctions is a major
concern. Unfortunately, theoretical modeling of
the complex markets for electric power would
prove extremely difficult, if not intractable, in the
case where network constraints are considered. In
addition, there are no markets similar enough in
form to gather data from and conduct an empirical
analysis. These types of questions are thus best
answered through the use of experimental testing.
Experimental Analysis
This section presents the design of the auction ex-
periments and the results. The setting of the ex-
periments consisted of the single-sided auction
with multiple units being offered and a vertical,
multiple-unit demand. While the experiments de-
tailed here were conducted for analysis of a whole-
sale market for electric power, no underlying net-
work or transmission grid was included. This
analysis, rather, presents a best case for the perfor-
mance of the tested auction mechanisms in differ-
ent market sizes.
Auction Selection and Rules
The first step in the analysis was the selection of
the most appropriate auction mechanisms for ex-
perimentation. Two different uniform price auc-
tions were selected. The last-accepted-offer (LAO)
version of the uniform price auction was selected
because of its common inclusion in proposals for
auction markets for wholesale electric power in
states such as New York. In this auction, price and
quantity offers are submitted in sealed bids. Once
all offers have been received, they are ordered
from lowest to highest. The single buyer than pur-
chases the cheapest units up to the point where the
total amount offered meets its demand. If this point
occurs within a multiple-unit offer from a single
seller, the buyer purchases just that portion needed
to meet demand. The price it pays for these units is
set at the highest offer price of the units it buys.
This uniform price is paid to every seller.
The LAO auction is not incentive compatible.
This can be understood easily by thinking about
the strategy of a seller with a generator at the mar-
gin. If that seller sets the price and offers units at
cost, the seller would make zero profits. Thus, such
a seller would be indifferent between that strategy
and not even participating in the auction.
The first-rejected-offer (FRO) uniform price
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retical properties in the single-unit case. In the case
where a single unit is being purchased, or no seller
can offer more than one unit, this auction is incen-
tive compatible. Under the rules of this mecha-
nism, the price is set at the lowest offer price of a
unit(s) not purchased. As in the LAO auction, any
offer crossing both sides of the point where supply
equals demand is partially purchased. It is impor-
tant to note in this situation that even though part
of the offer is not purchased, the part not sold does
not count in terms of setting the final price; the
price is set at the lowest offer for which none of the
units sold.
Unfortunately, as Ausubel and Cramton (1996)
have proven, the favorable theoretical properties of
the FRO auction do not carry over into the relevant
case of multiple units. To understand why this is
so, consider a firm with at least one very low cost
generator and at least one higher cost, but beneath
the competitive equilibrium price, generator. In
most circumstances, the firm will be able to drive
up the reigning price and increase its overall profits
by withholding capacity from its higher cost gen-
erator. Clearly, this action both raises the price and
lowers efficiency.
Experiment Design and Subjects
Group sizes of two, four, and six subjects were
investigated, Six was selected as a group size in the
hopes of creating a relatively competitive situation,
while the duopoly scenario was included to see the
potential for, and effects of, market power. Groups
of four were added to the analysis as perhaps the
most realistic for a wholesale market for electric
power. Given the spatial and technical limits to
transmitting electric power, it is doubtful that mar-
ket areas would contain more than four competi-
tors.
To give subjects in the different sized groups the
opportunity to earn within the same range of
money without altering the parameter setup of the
experiments, three exchange rates were used, with
more favorable rates going to larger groups. To
keep earnings reasonable, all auctions were run
with a reservation price of $.60. This allowed us to
announce a range of potential earnings, $15 to $35,
to students during recruitment of subjects.
Cost parameters were selected to mimic the
three typical levels of costs for electric power gen-
eration: base load, midlevel, and peaking. Each
subject had one generator on each cost level and a
total possible output capacity of five units of
power. Total capacity was divided such that each
subject had two “high” capacity generators (able
to generate a maximum of two units) and one
“low” capacity generator (capable of only a single
unit). There were two different cost and capacity
structures, so that there were two subjects of each
type in the groups of four, and three of each type in
the groups of six. Demand was perfectly inelastic
and set at one half the total capacity in the market,
Demand was therefore five, ten, and fifteen, for the
groups of two, four, and six, respectively. The cost
and demand structure for the groups of two experi-
ments can be seen in figure 1. In the other group
sizes, the shape of the supply curve remains the
same; only the scale changes.
While the parameters were the same for both
auction types, the same cannot be said of the re-
sultant optimal final prices. Optimal final prices
were considered as those that would result if all
participants in the auction offered their full capac-
ity at its cost. From figure 1 again, it can be seen
that the optimal price for the FRO auction would
be $,22, while for the LAO a price anywhere from
$.18 to $.22 could be considered optimal. For these
auctions, the optimal prices remained constant re-
gardless of group size.
Experiments ran for seventy-five periods. While
this may seem to be a lot of repetition, recall that
the actual markets will be run hourly. Therefore,
seventy-five periods represent only slightly more
than three days of experience in the new market.
Repetition is also essential to allow subjects to ac-
quaint themselves with the auction mechanism
and, more importantly, the actions and strategies of
others in their groups.
Subjects recruited for the experiments were un-
dergraduate business students at Cornell Univer-
sity. These students were selected with the belief
they would be the most representative of the types
of employees that generation companies would be
hiring to represent them in the actual auction mar-
kets. Most of the students were freshmen and
sophomores who had had, or were currently en-
rolled in, both introductory micro and macro eco-
nomics, Few of the students had participated pre-
viously in an economic experiment, and none were
allowed to participate more than once. Students
were told the experiments would not take more
than an hour and a half. Students were paid their
earnings in cash at the conclusion of experiments,
with an additional $5 for participation. Subjects
within groups that finished early were asked to
wait patiently for everyone to be done so as not to
disturb others and to maintain group anonymity.
Recruited student subjects participated in com-
puterized experiments under controlled conditions
in Cornell’s Laboratory for Experimental Econom-
ics and Decision Research. The software was de-
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Figurel. Demand and Generator Cost Curves for the Groups ofTwo Experiments
supplied by the Economic Science Laboratory at
the University of Arizona. The experiment’s user
interface was designed to be as straightforward as
possible. After all subjects have entered their per-
sonal information for record keeping, they are pre-
sented with the auction inputhmning screen. This
screen, which is displayed throughout the experi-
merit, details all information needed by subjectsto
make their price and quantity offer decisions. Spe-
cifically, students see how many generators they
control, the maximum capacity of each, and the
cost per unit of capacity. After each period, the
subjects see what units they managed to sell, the
final price, and their earoings for that period and
overall. The interfaces for all of the auction pro-
grams are identical to eliminate concerns that pre-
sentation variations could effect performance. For
similar reasons, the written instructions given to
subjects were also crafted to be as similar as pos-
sible.
Information
Subjects were given written instructions priorto
the start of the experiments and ample time for
questions. The instructions detailed the rules of the
auctions in a manner similar to the descriptions
given above. However, no information on possible
strategies wasgiven to the subjects. Also, from the
instructions, subjects knew other basic informat-
ion, including the reservation price and how many
periods the experiment would last, and knew that
everyone’s costs and capacities and demand would
remain the same throughout. While demand was
known to all, cost and capacity information was
private. In addition, no information was given as to
the specific distribution of the costs. Subjects were
merely informed that others in their group had
costs similar, possibly identical, to theirs for each
of the three generators. It was common knowledge
that everyone had the same total capacity, but it
was not revealed what cost level another’s low
capacity generator was on.
While subjects knew the size of their group, they
did not know which of the others in the room were
in their group. Seating patterns in the room were
carefully arranged to keep group members sepa-
rated at seemingly random intervals and never to
have more than two people with different cost
structures seated next to one another,
Offers also remained private throughout the ex-
periments. Only the final price was reported to the
subjects after each auction. Subjects knew how
much they sold but not how much any of the others
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easy to deduce in the groups of two, there were
instances where not enough supply was offered to
meet demand. These instances were not reported to
the subjects,
Price and Efficiency Findings
An assessment of the average final prices over the
last twenty-five periods of the experiments reveals
group size as a much greater determining factor
than auction type. Only in the groups of four did
auction type make a significant difference, with the
LAO having a lower average final price, As can be
seen graphically in figure 2, prices became pro-
gressively higher as group size became smaller.
Prices were in fact nearly twice as high in the
groups of two experiments as with the groups of
six. Even in the groups of six, though, none of the
auction mechanisms yielded prices at their optimal
levels. Evidence does indicate that prices were
headed downward, suggesting that experiments
with more periods may be needed to find the true
equilibrium.
Examining only average final prices over many
sessions hides some of the interesting variations in
the experiments, In individual sessions, there was a
noticeable amount of heterogeneity. This was true
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Figure 2. Average Final Prices Periods 51 to 75
these sessions, groups were at the $.60 reservation
price and at 100% efficiency over most of the last
twenty-five periods. Groups that failed to reach the
reservation price tended to have final prices in the
range of the high cost generators. Beyond that
point, subjects in these situations appeared deter-
mined to sell from their high cost generators, even
if for only a $.01 or $.02 profit.
The extent of group differences was most evi-
dent in the groups of four. Although group behav-
ior began to converge in the later periods, price
results anywhere from the optimal level to the res-
ervation price were observed in the early periods,
Here, more than anywhere, results seemed depen-
dant on who was in the group.
Efficiency levels are also displayed in graphical
form in figure 3. As noted by Ledyard, Porter, and
Rangel (1997), care needs to be taken in using and
analyzing efficiency measures. Here, the design of
the cost and capacity parameters had important im-
plications for the measurement of efficiency. For
instance, the set of possible efficiency values was
not continuous. The possible cost realizations im-
posed by the parameters increased by $.04 inter-
vals as production became less efficient. Group
size had an even more important and noticeable
effect on possible efficiency values. Specifically,
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efficiency values as more costly units were pro-
duced to meet demand. Thus, participants in the
groups of six actually needed to make more pro-
duction errors than those in the groups of two to
get the same value (consider that the second high-
est possible efficiency was .9789 in the groups of
six, compared with .9394 in the groups of two).
Efficiency values are thus not directly comparable
across group sizes, and care must be taken not to
become too negative in assessing auction perfor-
mance, particularly in the groups of two.
Comparing efficiency across auction types does
not reveal any superior performer. The FRO auc-
tion did perform surprisingly well, but its efficien-
cies were not significantly different from the levels
reached by the LAO auction for any of the group
sizes.
On the whole, efficiencies were lower than we
hypothesized. While many groups were able to
achieve and maintain 100% efficiency, many con-
tinued to exhibit low efficiencies even after sixty
or seventy periods of experience with identical
conditions. It was not entirely unheard of even af-
ter these lengths for some subjects still to offer
units from a higher cost generator at a price less
than from a lower cost generator. An error like this
would not be expected to persist, if it existed at all,
with bidders from actual generation companies.
Restricting subjects from entering higher cost gen-
erators for less than any lower cost generators
would have increased efficiencies in some in-
stances.
Evidence on Incentive Compatibility
A secondary issue of concern was how well the
auction institutions succeeded in getting subjects to
reveal their true costs and capacities. Both auctions
performed relatively closely in terms of cost rev-
elation, but as expected, offers in the LAO auction
tended to be slightly higher than those in the FRO
auction. Despite the offers in the FRO auction be-
ing less inflated than those in the LAO auction, it
was always the case that, given the price setting
ride, the FRO auction ended up being more expen-
sive.
For both auctions, the larger the group size, the
better the offers revealed costs. Actual cost curves
were least identifiable from offer curves in the
duopoly setting. As group size increased, there was
evident convergence both between the offer curves
from the two auctions and between them and the
cost curves. It would be an open question for future
research if group sizes beyond six would continue
this trend,
Supply reduction was evident in both auctions in
all group sizes. It is questionable, however, if this
was for any strategic reason. Given the information
about cost and demand structure given to subjects,
it should have been apparent to them that not all
their capacity could be sold. This would certainly
have been reinforced after even just the first few
periods of the experiments. For all auctions, supply
relegation was highest in the groups of two. In fact,
percentage of capacity revealed tended to decrease
for both auctions with larger group sizes.
Experiments with Network Constraints
Other factors beyond the basic rules of the auction
mechanism and size of the market complicate the
formation and performance of an electric power
market. Complications with the operation of an
electric grid, including the stochastic nature of
load, the associated need to maintain reliability,
voltage and line limits, and the locational variabil-
ity of transmission losses, have to be incorporated
into any market structure. Many of the constraints
imposed by a network make even the measurement
of important economic considerations in judging
markets difficult to determine. For instance, the
size of the market itself is highly dependent on the
constraints of the network and can vary within ar-
eas dependent on which generators are dispatched.
The answer in accounting for these complications
is to create a smart market, where offers into the
auction are adjusted for nodal pricing through
transmission charges determined by the optimal
power flow (McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith 1991).
The next research being conducted at Cornell adds
a smart market with a realistic, while simplified,
electric power network.
This second research strand investigates a net-
work environment using the LAO auction. The ex-
perimental platform used, developed by Ray Zim-
merman (personal communication), has the added
benefit of being web based. One group size has
been studied, with the group containing a subset
operating in a load pocket, enabling simultaneous
analysis of different market situations. Results
from three early pilot experiments are included in
Bernard et al. (1998). In essence, these beginning
experimental investigations support the above re-
sults. In a complex environment, with six genera-
tors, two of whom are located in a load pocket,
prices approach duopoly levels inside the load
pocket. In addition, nodal prices throughout the
network are much more volatile under conditions
where market power is exercised. This volatility
could threaten system stability given current prac-
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the sale of generation assets in areas like the North-
east, where network constraints may give rise to
areas of potential market power.
A Note on Future Research
Neither of the above sets of experiments comes
near exhausting the areas for research, Electricity
is not a standard type of commodity, and that fact
gives rise to many further complications to market
formation. Beyond the basic market for real power,
there is the need to provide a series of what are
called ancillary services. Ancillary services include
such necessary elements as reactive power supply
and voltage control, maintaining system frequency,
and spinning reserve, Many of these services re-
quire separate markets that will have to operate in
concert with the generation market. Wilson (1998)
discusses the issues and interrelationships involved
in these markets with an example to spinning re-
serves. The overall result is that the structure of
these markets is relatively complicated, careful at-
tention must be paid to the incentives across mar-
kets, and it is not clear how well the markets will
perform. These new market systems provide rich
avenues for further experimental investigation.
Conclusions
Experimental analysis has produced a number of
preliminary conclusions relevant for restructuring
of the electric power industry. First, in testing auc-
tion institutions, as Ausubel and Cramton (1996)
have shown in theory, the uniform price first-
rejected-offer auction fails to be incentive compat-
ible in practice when sellers own multiple units.
Somewhat surprisingly, a uniform price last-
accepted-offer auction performs slightly better un-
der the same cost and demand conditions. Since
this is the institution most often proposed or used
to date in electric power markets, this is a positive
finding. Overall, the number of firms competing to
supply the fixed demand proved to be a much more
important determinant of price than the type of
auction employed. Prices were near competitive
levels with six sellers but doubled with two com-
petitors. In the case of four sellers, there were in-
stances of groups reaching results at the levels of
both the other group sizes.
On the whole, there are performance questions
to using either auction mechanism on a wholesale
market for electric power. While restructuring pro-
posals typically contain a single-sided market for
the short term, results suggest that speed is desired
in switching to a double-sided auction. The pricing
and efficiency abilities of other market forms are
another important application for experimental
economics.
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